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Abstract
I study how a system of international transfers based on dividend
income affects monetary policy in a two-country model with incomplete
asset markets. I show that macroeconomic shocks alter international
transfer payments and determine cross-border wealth effects on labour
supply, output and consumption. The direction of these effects de-
pends on the nature of the underlying disturbance: technology and wage
markup shocks cause wealth effects that stabilise consumption relative
to output, whereas monetary and price markup shocks cause wealth
effects that destabilise it. Numerical work shows that this affects the
balance of monetary policy between inflation and output stabilisation.
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1 Introduction
The global financial crisis that started in 2007-08 hit some areas of Europe
particularly hard and exposed some weaknesses in its Economic and Mone-
tary Union. Although emergency responses were implemented to mitigate the
effects of the shock, the economic disruption opened wide interregional gaps
in employment and real income growth, among other dimensions. Since these
disparities persist today and are being corrected very slowly under the cur-
rent institutional architecture—as shown by the European Commission (2017),
among others—economists and policymakers initiated a debate on how to com-
plete the union with mechanisms for economic re-convergence that leave mem-
ber countries better prepared to absorbe future shocks1. One possible option
is to establish a system of international income redistribution based on fiscal
transfers. The question then arises as to whether and how its existence would
change the kind of stabilisation policy that monetary authorities should follow.
In this paper I investigate how the presence of an international transfer
scheme affects the transmission of macroeconomic shocks across borders and
alters the objectives of monetary policy. To this end, I cast my analysis in a
two-country, two-good dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
with monopolistic competition, nominal rigidities and incomplete international
asset markets, which I solve using nonlinear methods. The distinctive feature
of my framework is that it considers a system of transfers based on the col-
lection and international redistribution of firms’ profits, so that households
1See the so-called “Five Presidents’ Report” by Juncker (2015) and the International
Monetary Fund research paper by Berger, Dell’Ariccia, and Obstfeld (2018), among others.
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effectively receive dividend payments from foreign firms. This simple arrange-
ment determines cross-border wealth effects that affect labour supply, output
and consumption over the business cycle. Under a conventional specification
of preferences, technologies and macroeconomic shocks, I show that these ef-
fects can alter international risk sharing and change the priorities of monetary
policymakers, i.e. the relative importance of price and output stability.
The foundation of my theoretical framework is an open-economy New Key-
nesian model similar to Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2002) and Benigno and Be-
nigno (2003). I depart from these pioneering works in two main dimensions.
First, I dispense with the assumption of complete international asset markets.
I allow households to exchange state-contingent securities within their own
countries, so that my model maintains a representative agent formulation, but
I assume that financial assets cannot be traded internationally. Second, while
the early literature on monetary policy in open economies excluded the pos-
sibility that countries may transfer some output or profits to each other, I
introduce an international redistribution system that leaves economies inter-
connected via two channels: a conventional trade linkage and a novel financial
connection operating through international transfer payments.
My work is not the first to introduce some form of financial interdependence
into a DSGE setting: earlier explorations are Tille (2008) and Devereux and
Sutherland (2008). Neither work, however, focuses explicitly on redistribu-
tive transfers nor considers monetary policy tradeoffs. The former develops a
model with exogenous portfolios of equity and bonds to investigate how differ-
ent holdings of external assets and liabilities affect the transmission of macroe-
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conomic shocks. However, it does not evaluate alternative monetary policies.
The latter proposes a model with endogenous portfolio choice to explore how
this mechanism interacts with monetary policy. Since it only considers pro-
ductivity and interest-rate shocks as sources of uncertainty, the central bank
faces no short-run tradeoff there2. By contrast, here I consider an economy
where cost-push shocks determine a conflict between inflation and output sta-
bility. My contribution is that I investigate explicitly how the existence of a
transfer scheme affects the priorities of central banks.
The new channel of international macroeconomic interdependence opened
by transfer payments in my model works as follows. A supranational insti-
tution collects a fixed portion of the profits realised by firms in each coun-
try and pays them to the households of the other country. With this ar-
rangement, net income transfers occur endogenously over the business cycle:
when macroeconomic disturbances affect the profitability of firms asymmetri-
cally across countries, differentials arise between the payments these economies
make to each other. Since households receive these transfers in a lump-sum
fashion, movements in profits determine cross-border wealth effects on labour
supply that have implications for the short-run dynamics of economic activ-
ity. These spillovers interfere with the risk sharing provided by terms-of-trade
movements. I show with numerical work that their strength depends on the
size of the transfer system, while their direction depends on the nature of the
2In environments of that sort, negative productivity shocks open a positive gap between
the level of output of the economy with nominal rigidities and its flexible-price counterpart,
which causes inflation to rise. Both inflation and the output gap determine a loss of social
welfare. There is no monetary policy tradeoff because the same response—i.e. an interest
rate increase—tackles both problems.
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shocks that cause macroeconomic fluctuations.
The connection between the direction of the wealth effects and the sources
of business cycles is explained by the fact that transfers are tied to firms’ prof-
its, whereas the dynamics of consumption depends on that of output. As a
consequence, whether international dividend payments stabilise consumption
against fluctuations in economic activity or not depends on the comovement of
output and profits. Such a comovement varies in response to different macroe-
conomic disturbances. Shocks to productivity and wage markups induce a
positive comovement of output and profits. Conditional on these disturbances,
households receive net transfer payments from abroad when domestic output
is low, whereas they make net payments to foreigners when output is high;
these countercyclical transfers of income stabilise domestic consumption rela-
tive to economic activity. On the contrary, shocks to interest rates and price
markups induce a negative comovement of output and profits. Conditional
on these disturbances, households receive net transfers when domestic output
is high and make net transfers when it is low; these procyclical transfers of
income exert a destabilising role on consumption.
The main point of the paper can be summarised as follows. The presence
of an income transfer system based on the redistribution of profits creates
wealth effects that impede an efficient sharing of risk via endogenous price
adjustments. Whether these effects mitigate or exacerbate the volatility of
consumption matters for monetary policy. More precisely, the stabilisation of
output is important in economies where this variable displays large fluctuations
compared to consumption; in that case, a policy of flexible inflation targeting
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(whereby some price stability is traded off for more output stability) can be
desirable. Conversely, the stabilisation of output is less important in economies
where this variable is less volatile than consumption; there, a policy of stricter
inflation targeting tends to be more desirable. The fact that income transfers
can alter the monetary policy mix has a key policy implication: a correct
identification of what causes the business cycle is particularly important under
an international redistribution system, because it provides guidance on how
participating countries should conduct monetary policy.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model
with competitive labour markets and Section 3 solves for its equilibrium. Sec-
tion 4 discusses international income transfers, wealth effects and macroeco-
nomic adjustment in that environment. Section 5 defines my welfare criterion
and studies monetary policy tradeoffs. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix
considers an economy with nominal wage rigidities and wage markup shocks.
2 Income transfers in a two-country model
I consider a two-country DSGE model with incomplete international markets
and country-specific goods. Each country is populated by a continuum of
measure one of infinitely lived households who get utility from consuming
domestic and imported goods, and disutility from working. Households fully
share risk within each country by exchanging a full set of contingent assets, so
that attention can be limited to representative agents.
International financial markets are incomplete à la Heathcote and Perri
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(2002): no private asset is available for trade between the countries. House-
holds issue riskless one-period nominal bonds that cannot be traded across
borders; these are in zero net supply as in Galí (2008) and Galí and Mona-
celli (2005), among others, and their prices are controlled by the local central
banks. The model abstracts from different currencies: the prices of all goods
are expressed in the same unit of account. As there is no international capital
mobility, the countries keep independent monetary policies.
In each country, production takes place in two stages. First, monopolis-
tically competitive firms employ local workers and produce a continuum of
measure one of differentiated intermediate goods, indexed by i; these goods
are not traded internationally. Second, perfectly competitive firms adopt a
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology to aggregate domestically
produced intermediates into final consumption goods, which are freely traded.
A supranational institution redistributes income across countries in the fol-
lowing way: it collects exogenously fixed portions of the profits of firms in each
economy and transfers them to the households of the other country. These pay-
ments are a source of international spillovers of macroeconomic disturbances.
The incompleteness of international asset markets emphasises this channel; the
impossibility of borrowing and lending after uncertainty is realised exacerbates
the impact of unexpected movements in dividend payments on employment,
output and consumption. Although empirical evidence of internationally in-
tegrated markets for debt instruments, such as Lane (2013), lends interest to
the study of economies where bonds are traded across borders, this mechanism
would be blunted there because households could partly offset surpluses and
7
shortfalls of transfer payments through intertemporal trade.
2.1 Households
All households within each country supply an identical labour service taking
the wage as given. The Appendix extends the analysis to an environment
where workers supply differentiated labour services in a monopolistically com-
petitive market and set the wage for their labour type at random intervals.
2.1.1 Intertemporal problem: utility maximisation
Households choose consumption, saving and labour supply to maximise their
lifetime utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, nt)
subject to the following budget constraint:
ptct + qtbt+1 = bt + wtnt + (1− s) ph,tΠh,t + spf,tΠf,t.
pt represents the consumer price index (CPI) of all domestically consumed
goods, whereas ph,t and pf,t are the individual producer prices (PPIs) of home
and foreign goods. qt is the price of a nominally risk-free, one-period discount
bond that is not traded internationally. bt measures the holding of bonds that
pay a return in the current period. wt is the nominal wage and nt measures
the hours worked. Πh,t and Πf,t are the profits of the firms located at home
and in the foreign country, denoted in units of the respective goods produced.
By virtue of the international transfer scheme, the household of each country
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receives a fraction s of foreign profits and a fraction 1−s of domestic profits3.
2.1.2 Intratemporal problem: consumption allocation
Each period, households choose the bundles of goods that maximise consump-
tion, defined as a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator with imports share ζ.
The static problem faced by households in the home country reads
max
ch,t,cf,t
ct ≡
(
1
1− ζ
)1−ζ (1
ζ
)ζ
(ch,t)1−ζ (cf,t)ζ
s.t. ptct = ph,tch,t + pf,tcf,t.
The price of the consumption bundle is measured by the index
pt ≡ (ph,t)1−ζ (pf,t)ζ . (1)
As foreign households have analogous preferences, the foreign CPI is similar.
2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Final goods producers
Perfectly competitive producers demand local inputs, indexed by i, to make
final goods yh,t using standard CES technologies:
max
yh,t(i)
ph,tyh,t −
ˆ 1
0
ph,t (i) yh,t (i) di s.t. yh,t =
(ˆ 1
0
yh,t (i)
εt−1
εt di
) εt
εt−1
.
3As the two countries are equally sized, such a symmetric configuration of income trans-
fers implies that these economies make zero net payments to each other in the long run.
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The elasticity of substitution (ES) between varieties of intermediates (εt) is
subject to exogenous innovations that cause cost-push shocks in the goods
market. These disturbances determine fluctuations in the gap between the
natural allocation and the efficient one, putting the monetary authority in the
dilemma of stabilising prices or economic activity. The production of foreign
goods yf,t involves analogous technologies and shocks.
2.2.2 Intermediate goods producers
In the home country, monopolistically competitive firms make intermediate
goods i with the following technology4:
yh,t (i) = atnt (i) . (2)
As workers are internationally immobile, labour is entirely supplied by locals.
The productivity parameter at is common to all domestic firms and evolves
exogenously over time according to a stochastic process specified below. Firms
set the price of their goods to maximise profits in a Calvo-Yun fashion5, subject
to isoelastic demands by final goods producers:
max
p¯h,t(i)
Et
∞∑
τ=0
θτpqt,t+τ
{
yh,t+τ (i)
p¯h,t (i)
ph,t+τ
−Ψ (yh,t+τ (i))
}
s.t. yh,t+τ (i) =
(
ph,t+τ (i)
ph,t+τ
)−εt
yh,t+τ ,
4The model abstracts from physical capital accumulation. Investment would reduce prof-
its and potentially alter the transmission mechanism of international transfers; see Coeur-
dacier and Rey (2012). I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
5The infrequent adjustment of prices implies that monetary policy has real effects.
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where qt,t+τ = βτEt (λt+τ/λt) denotes households’ stochastic discount factor
for τ periods-ahead real payoffs6, θp is the index of price stickiness, the Ψ (·)
function represents the real cost of production, and p¯h,t (i) is the desired reset
price. Foreign price setters face an analogous problem.
2.3 Monetary policy
The nominal returns on domestic and foreign bonds, defined as Rt ≡ 1/qt
and R∗t ≡ 1/q∗t respectively, are certain at the issuing date and represent the
instruments of monetary policy. Central banks adjust them to stabilise prices
and output according to the following Taylor rules:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)γR [
(pih,t)γpi
(
yh,t
yh,t−1
)γy]1−γR
mt, (3)
R∗t
R∗
=
(
R∗t−1
R∗
)γR [
(pif,t)γpi
(
yf,t
yf,t−1
)γy]1−γR
m∗t . (4)
R and R∗ represent long-run targets for the gross nominal rates of interest;
they are equal to the inverse of the discount factor β. The components mt and
m∗t are exogenous disturbances whose properties are explained below.
Following Clarida et al. (2002) and Galí and Monacelli (2005), the interest
rate rules are specified in terms of the PPI inflation rates pih,t ≡ ph,t/ph,t−1
and pif,t ≡ pf,t/pf,t−1, rather than the CPI inflation rates pit ≡ pt/pt−1 and
pi∗t ≡ p∗t/p∗t−1. Since the law of one price always holds, the relevant distortion
is the dispersion of the prices of local intermediate goods. As shown by Engel
6The exclusive use of the discount factor of domestic households is due to the fact that
they retain exclusive control over the firm despite the transfer of dividends to foreigners.
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(2011)7, the elimination of producer price inflation is sufficient to eradicate it.
The policy rates also react to movements in economic activity. These are
specified in terms of output growth rates rather than output gaps, which makes
rules (3) and (4) “operational” in the sense of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007).
2.4 Exogenous processes
Each country is affected by three sources of uncertainty: shocks to technology
(at), to interest rates (mt) and to the ES between intermediate products (εt).
These variables follow first-order autoregressive processes in logs:
log zt = ρz log zt−1 + ez,t,
where zt = at,mt, εt/ε¯. ε¯ represents the steady-state ES. The innovations
(ez,t) follow orthogonal i.i.d. normal processes with zero mean and constant
variance. To highlight the endogenous transmission mechanism that operates
in the presence of the income transfer scheme, I assume these innovations are
internationally uncorrelated: corr (ez, e∗z) = 0.
3 Equilibrium conditions
In this section I present the optimality conditions associated with the problems
of households and firms, the law of motion of prices and the market-clearing
conditions. I limit my exposition to the equations that characterise the home
7This is true regardless of international income transfers: interest rate rules that include
foreign price inflation yield lower social welfare in this environment, as argued below.
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country; analogous equations hold in the foreign one.
3.1 Households
I consider an economy with competitive labour markets and flexible wages;
monopoly power and nominal frictions in the labour market are introduced in
the Appendix. Households supply undifferentiated labour services and opti-
mise their labour effort taking the wage as given, according to the expression
−un (ct, nt)
wt/pt
= λt.
The first-order conditions (FOCs) for the intertemporal optimisation of con-
sumption and savings are standard: see the Appendix.
The demands for domestic and imported consumption goods are as follows:
ch,t = (1− ζ)
(
ph,t
pt
)−1
ct, cf,t = (ζ)
(
pf,t
pt
)−1
ct. (5)
3.2 Firms
3.2.1 Final goods production
The input demand schedules that solve the problems of final goods producers
in the home country are as follows:
yh,t (i) =
(
ph,t (i)
ph,t
)−εt
yh,t. (6)
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The associated PPI implied by perfect competition is
ph,t =
(ˆ 1
0
ph,t (i)1−εt di
) 1
1−εt
. (7)
3.2.2 Intermediate goods production
In a symmetric equilibrium, all price resetters face the same problem and
choose the same reset price. Auxiliary variables g1h,t and g2h,t can be defined
as outlined in the Appendix to rewrite the optimal price-setting conditions of
firms in the home country as follows:
g2h,t =Mp,tg1h,t, (8)
where the desired “frictionless” price markup isMp,t ≡ εtεt−1 .
3.2.3 Productivity, employment and aggregate output
As outlined in the Appendix, the input demand schedule (6) and the produc-
tion function (2) can be combined with a labour market-clearing condition to
get the exact aggregate production function for home-country goods:
yh,t =
atnt
dph,t
. (9)
Price dispersion in the home economy is defined as
dph,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
(
ph,t (i)
ph,t
)−εt
di.
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3.3 Dynamics of prices
Under the assumption that all resetters in a country choose the same price
(symmetric equilibrium) and that the distribution of prices among non-resetters
at time t corresponds to the distribution of effective prices at time t− 1 (law
of large numbers), the PPI (7) evolves as follows:
1 = θp
(
ph,t−1
ph,t
)1−εt
+ (1− θp)
(
p¯h,t
ph,t
)1−εt
.
By the same logic, we can define an optimal relative price p˜h,t ≡ p¯h,t/ph,t and
rewrite the price dispersion index recursively:
dph,t = θp
(
1
pih,t
)−εt
dph,t−1 + (1− θp) (p˜h,t)−εt .
3.3.1 Market clearing
Labour market clearing has been imposed in the calculation of the aggregate
production functions. Goods market clearing requires the following conditions:
yh,t = ch,t + c∗h,t, yf,t = cf,t + c∗f,t.
As assets cannot be traded internationally, bond market clearing requires
bt = 0, b∗t = 0.
The Appendix lists the whole set of equilibrium conditions for this economy.
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4 Equilibrium dynamics
In this section I investigate how the presence of the transfer scheme affects the
response of the main macroeconomic variables to exogenous shocks.
Period utility functions are specified as follows:
u (ct, nt) = ln ct − n
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ.
The time interval of the model is a quarter. Table 1 displays the benchmark
parameterisation adopted for the simulations8. The absence of home bias in
consumption makes the preferences of home and foreign households identical.
Since both the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the elasticity of sub-
stitution between domestic goods and imports are unity, the Cole and Obstfeld
(1991) result obtains in the absence of transfers: endogenous terms-of-trade
movements fully neutralise output risks, so ct and c∗t always move one-to-one,
as if international asset markets were complete. Transfers break down this
risk-sharing mechanism: as movements in cross-border payments shift income
across countries and cause wealth effects, ct and c∗t move asymmetrically de-
spite the unit elasticities configuration9. The transfer scheme interferes with
an efficient sharing of risk because the share of redistributed profits is fixed
rather than adjusted over the business cycle.
The business-cycle properties of the economy with and without dividend
8While my objective is to illustrate the key mechanism that characterises an economy
with income transfers within a small-scale model, I pick reasonable parameter values that
are common in the New Keynesian literature: see Galí (2008).
9Trade imbalances mirror these income transfers, as current accounts must be zero be-
cause acquisitions and sales of foreign assets are not allowed.
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Table 1: Parameter values for the model
Parameter Value Description
ϕ 1 Frisch elasticity of labour supply
ε¯ 6 Steady-state ES between intermediates
ζ 0.5 Share of imported goods in consumption
β 0.99 Subjective discount factor
θp 0.66 Price stickiness parameter
γR 0.7 Interest rate smoothing parameter in the Taylor rule
γpi 1.5 Inflation parameter in the Taylor rule
γy 0.125 Output growth parameter in the Taylor rule
ρz 0.95 Serial correlation of exogenous processes zt = at,mt, εtε¯
std (ez) 0.01 Standard deviation of exogenous shocks to zt = at,mt, εtε¯
s0 0 Share of redistributed dividends (no transfers case)
s1/2 0.5 Share of redistributed dividends (case with transfers)
transfers (labelled with s1/2 and s0, respectively) are reported in Tables 2 and
3. The impulse response functions (IRFs) to macroeconomic shocks under each
arrangement are compared in the next section.
4.1 Technology shocks
Figure 1 shows the effects of a positive technology shock in the home country,
which causes a decrease in the marginal cost of production and an increase in
output. The real profits of domestic firms jump, and since both consumption
and leisure are normal goods, home households reduce their supply of labour.
Without a redistribution scheme (s0, dashed red lines), home and foreign
consumption expand equally thanks to the risk-sharing role played by the
terms of trade. Foreign households do not receive any payment from abroad,
so foreign labour supply is unaffected and foreign output is stable10.
10Home and foreign products are independent in consumption with the configuration of
elasticities adopted here. As shown by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), shocks to the supply of
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a technology shock with and without transfers
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With the redistribution scheme (s1/2, solid blue lines), part of the extra
profits of domestic firms are paid to foreigners in the form of transfers. This
provokes a wealth effect on labour supply abroad: the lump-sum component of
foreign households’ income jumps, so labour effort is replaced by more leisure.
As a consequence, foreign hours and output fall while the real wage rises.
This triggers a second round of wealth effects: since the profits of foreign firms
drop, households in the home country receive smaller payments from abroad
and supply more labour. For this reason, output and hours worked in the home
country exceed those observed without transfers. The combined result of these
spillovers is a transitory redistribution of consumption to foreign households,
as consumption rises more in the foreign economy than in the domestic one
on impact.
one good do not spill over into the supply of the other in this case.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a monetary shock with and without transfers
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4.2 Monetary shocks
Figure 2 shows the impact of a contractionary monetary policy shock in the
home country. The rise in the domestic real interest rate exerts a contrac-
tionary effect on output and pushes inflation down. Since nominal wages are
flexible but prices are not, real wages fall and aggregate profits jump.
In the absence of redistributive transfers (s0, dashed red lines), both home
and foreign consumption fall because the total supply of home goods has de-
creased. The decline in ct and c∗t is symmetric again due to the endogenous
adjustment of the terms of trade. Since foreign households are insulated from
the dynamics of home profits, there is no change in foreign hours worked,
output and profits.
In the presence of transfers (s1/2, solid blue lines), international wealth
effects come into play again. Foreign households receive extra payments from
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abroad and supply less labour, so foreign output and profits decline. House-
holds in the home country, in turn, receive smaller dividend payments from
foreign firms and step up their labour effort; as a consequence, domestic out-
put is higher than in the previous case. These spillovers shift income across
borders again: their impact is a pronounced fall in home consumption and a
jump in foreign consumption11.
4.3 Cost-push shocks
Figure 3 shows the impulse responses of selected macroeconomic variables to
an adverse cost-push shock in the home country, which takes the form of
an exogenous 1 percent decrease in εt. The shock temporarily boosts price
markups in the home economy, expanding the wedge between the marginal
product of labour and the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure. Output, hours and real wages fall, while real profits rise.
In the presence of transfers (s1/2, solid blue lines), additional dividends are
paid to foreign households, triggering a wealth effect that reduces their supply
of labour; foreign output and profits fall. This triggers a second wealth effect:
domestic households receive smaller dividends from abroad and supply more
labour, aggravating the fall of real wages in the home country.
In the absence of transfers (s0, dashed red lines), foreign households are
immune to changes in the profits of home firms, so labour supply and output
are unaffected abroad. The extra profits of home firms are received entirely
by domestic households, with stronger wealth effects on their labour supply.
11The sum of home and foreign consumption (not shown here) clearly falls, due to the
decline in the production of home goods caused by the contractionary monetary shock.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a cost-push shock in the goods market with
and without transfers
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For this reason, domestic real wages are higher and output is lower than in
the case with s1/2.
4.4 Wealth effects and the size of the transfer scheme
The magnitude of the cross-border wealth effects triggered by macroeconomic
shocks depends on the size of the dividend transfers. I uncover this connection
in Figure 4, where I plot the behaviour of hours worked and consumption in
each economy conditional on the three shocks examined above as s ranges
between 0 and 100 percent.
The symmetric configuration of dividend transfers makes it easier to vi-
sualise the spillover mechanism, because it implies that net transfers are nil
in steady state, so consumption is identical across the two countries in the
long run. International wealth effects only occur in the short run, when the
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Figure 4: Size of the transfers and the international spillover of shocks
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net transfers between these economies depart from zero. Asymmetric transfer
schemes (whereby one country is a net receiver of dividend income in the long
run) would affect the mechanism of interest quantitatively but not qualita-
tively.
The picture confirms that shocks to the home country leave foreign hours
(and thus output) unaffected when there are no transfers. Because of the
endogenous risk-sharing role played by the terms of trade, a perfect positive
conditional correlation between domestic and foreign consumption is observed.
As a larger and larger redistribution of dividends is introduced, stronger and
stronger wealth effects are triggered by international transfers that cause larger
and larger spillovers of macroeconomic disturbances across borders. These
show up in larger and larger movements of foreign hours worked on impact
(due to the first wealth effect), as well as smaller and smaller movements in
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domestic hours worked (due to the second wealth effect). Since the conditional
correlation of consumption across countries declines, the redistribution scheme
effectively reduces international risk sharing. This happens because the size of
the transfer scheme (s) is exogenous instead of being adjusted optimally over
the business cycle.
5 Monetary policy and welfare
In this section I study monetary policy within the class of interest rate rules (3)
and (4)12. In order to compare the performance of different parameterisations
of these rules, I adopt a welfare-based criterion: I search for the Taylor rule
parameters vector that maximises the conditional expectation of the total
lifetime utility of households, given the current state of the economy.
I define the welfare of the home and foreign households as follows:
Vh,t ≡ Et
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, nt) , Vf,t ≡ Et
∞∑
t=0
βtu (c∗t , n∗t ) . (10)
These welfare measures are rearranged recursively and then appended to the
competitive equilibrium conditions of the model. I depart from the practice of
combining a second-order approximation of the welfare function with a first-
order approximation of the remaining equilibrium conditions. That approach
would be prone to large approximation errors with incomplete markets, be-
12The identification of the optimal monetary policy would be challenging in this environ-
ment, because one would have to maximise welfare subject to the whole system of nonlinear
competitive equilibrium conditions of the economy. As explained below, a characterisation
of optimal policy with a linear-quadratic approximation is not pursued for accuracy reasons.
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cause some second-order terms of the welfare functions (10) would be ignored
while others are included. As shown by Kim and Kim (2003), such a miscal-
culation can result in spurious welfare rankings.
Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), I compute a second-order accu-
rate solution of the entire expanded system around its non-stochastic steady
state. This has two main implications. First, I do not need to make the
steady state efficient, so I dispense with the factor-input subsidies financed by
lump-sum taxes that induce the perfectly competitive long-run level of em-
ployment. Second, I adopt recursive representations of the exact nonlinear
dynamics of prices (and wages, in the Appendix) rather than New Keynesian
Phillips Curves, so I must keep track of additional state variables that measure
price (and wage) dispersion.
The identification of the most desirable monetary policy mix involves com-
paring welfare (10) across different calibrations of the Taylor rules. Expec-
tations are taken conditional on the initial state of the economy being the
competitive equilibrium non-stochastic steady state, which is independent of
monetary policy; this ensures that the economy starts from the same point in
all cases under consideration.
Numerical work indicates that welfare is decreasing in the interest rate
smoothing parameter γR, increasing in the inflation response coefficient γpi,
and non-monotonic (namely, concave) in the output reaction coefficient γy.
These results support a policy of “flexible inflation targeting” that trades off
price stability against some output stability. The level of welfare of a non-
stochastic economy can be approached by adopting Taylor rules with arbitrar-
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ily large inflation coefficients, no inertia in interest rates, and suitable output
coefficients that depend on the size of the transfer scheme.
These well-established facts can be explained as follows. First, an inertial
adjustment of interest rates is unnecessary because there is no need to stabilise
the opportunity cost of holding money in a cashless economy. Second, inflation
stabilisation reduces the need to reset prices and keeps the economy close to
the “natural” or flexible-price allocation. Third, a policy of “leaning against
the wind” reduces output volatility in the presence of cost-push shocks.
As observed above, the relevant inflation target in this economy only in-
cludes the price of domestic goods. Since the law of one price holds, central
banks do not have to target movements of imports prices: these are regarded
as efficient. Furthermore, as domestic and imported goods are independent
in consumption, no cross-border supply spillovers create potential gains from
monetary cooperation. In fact, interest rate rules augmented to respond to
foreign inflation à la Clarida et al. (2002) would reduce welfare here.
Without cost-push shocks, central banks face no short-run tradeoff and
inflation stabilisation is the sole objective of monetary policy, regardless of
transfer payments. In that case, the welfare level of a non-stochastic economy
is well approximated by the constrained13 configuration of interest rate rules
(γR, γpi, γy) = (0, 4, 0). Figure 5 shows how welfare changes as we vary each
Taylor rule parameter around this combination, holding the others fixed14.
13In principle, the welfare maximisation problem has no solution because the objective
function is monotonically increasing in γpi and the domain of this parameter is unbounded.
Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), I rule out coefficients larger than 4 on the
grounds that they would not be realistic in practice.
14The first panel cuts the welfare surface at γy = 0 and γr = 0. The second one is drawn
with γpi = 4 and γr = 0. The third one uses γpi = 4 and γy = 0.
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Figure 5: Cross-sections of the welfare surface with and without transfers
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In the presence of cost-push shocks, instead, monetary authorities must
strike a balance between different goals because the natural level of output
departs from the efficient one, with the consequence that stabilising prices (in
order to keep economic activity in line with its flexible-price counterpart) is
no longer sufficient to address all the existing distortions; as is well known,
some output stabilisation takes the economy closer to the socially optimal
allocation under these conditions. What is distinctive about a world with
transfer payments is that the international wealth effects mechanism shown
above alters the balance of monetary policy between these two objectives.
The existence of a monetary policy tradeoff goes unnoticed when the volatil-
ity of cost-push shocks is as small as in Table 1; strict inflation targeting
remains the welfare-maximising policy in that case. However, the monetary
policy dilemma becomes visible if cost-push shocks get volatile enough. When
std (eε) = 0.25, for instance, central banks can improve upon strict inflation
targeting by putting some emphasis on output stability. As shown in Fig-
ure 6 and Table 4, the monetary policy mix that maximises welfare features
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Figure 6: Output stabilisation and welfare with cost-push shocks
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Table 4: Size of transfers and monetary policy mix with cost-push shocks
s 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
(γR, γpi, γy) (0, 4, 1) (0, 4, 1) (0, 4, 1) (0, 4, 0.5) (0, 4, 0)
a positive output coefficient in this case, as long as the size of the transfer
scheme stays between 0 and 50 percent (which is the most interesting range
in practice). The output parameter declines quickly when s gets larger than
that, because the international wealth effects observed in Figure 3 become
strong; they reduce the volatility of economic activity and hours conditional
on domestic cost-push shocks, tilting the balance towards inflation stability.
These results illustrate how the wealth effects associated with transfers
tend to stabilise output relative to consumption when cost-push shocks affect
the production of final goods. The Appendix adds monopoly power in the
labour market and nominal wage rigidities to show that the opposite happens
conditional on cost-push shocks that affect the supply of labour15: wealth
effects destabilise output relative to consumption in that case.
15These shocks are modelled as exogenous movements in the elasticity of substitution
between different types of labour, along the lines of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007).
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Whether an international redistribution system based on dividend transfers
mitigates or exacerbates the relative volatility of consumption and output
depends on the direction of the wealth effects set into motion by exogenous
shocks. This, in turn, depends on how output and profits comove conditional
on each type of macroeconomic disturbance.
On one hand, output and profits comove positively under (i) technology
shocks and (ii) cost-push shocks in the labour market, as shown in the Ap-
pendix. Conditional on these disturbances, the redistribution scheme stabilises
consumption because it determines countercyclical income transfers: net pay-
ments are received from abroad when home output and profits are low, and
vice-versa. On the other hand, output and profits comove negatively under (iii)
monetary shocks and (iv) cost-push shocks in the goods market. Conditional
on these disturbances, the redistribution scheme destabilises consumption be-
cause it determines procyclical income transfers instead: net payments are
received from abroad when domestic output is high, and vice-versa.
The output stabilisation objective tends to be less important when eco-
nomic activity experiences a relatively small volatility compared to consump-
tion; strict inflation targeting tends to emerge as the most desirable monetary
policy in that case. This is what happens in economies dominated by shocks
(iii) and (iv). By the same logic, output stabilisation becomes more important
in economies dominated by shocks (i) and (ii). A policy of flexible inflation
targeting tends to yield the highest welfare there.
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6 Concluding remarks
The possibility of establishing a supranational income redistribution system, as
recently envisaged in Europe by Berger, Dell’Ariccia, and Obstfeld (2018), for
instance, directs attention to the role of transfer payments in the international
transmission of economic shocks. The purpose of the present work has been
to explore the impact of one such mechanism on macroeconomic dynamics
and the conduct of monetary policy in the context of an optimisation-based
framework.
Within a fairly standard two-country New Keynesian model, I have shown
that international wealth effects on labour supply materialise following tech-
nology, monetary and cost-push shocks if redistribution is implemented in the
form of lump-sum transfers of a fixed portion of firms’ profits. These effects re-
allocate consumption across countries, and cause macroeconomic adjustment
to differ from what would be observed without a transfer system of this kind.
The key mechanism at work is as follows. As the comovement of aggregate
output and profits varies in response to distinct kinds of disturbances, so does
the direction of wealth effects—because these are tied to international dividend
payments. The procyclicality or countercyclicality of such transfers, in turn,
determines whether consumption is stabilised or destabilised relative to output
under this system. The implication for monetary policy is that central banks
should place more emphasis on output stabilisation in the presence of shocks
that cause a positive comovement of output and profits (such as shocks to
technology or to the wage markup), and less emphasis on such a goal in the
presence of shocks that cause a negative comovement of output and profits
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(such as shocks to interest rates or to the price markup).
Since the choice of the monetary policy mix depends on the relative im-
portance of different macroeconomic disturbances, a correct identification of
the sources of business cycles is particularly important for monetary policy
in the presence of an international system of income transfers based on the
cross-border redistribution of profits.
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Appendix
Here I present an extended version of the model with imperfectly competitive
labour markets and infrequent nominal wage adjustment. The households of
each country are made up of a continuum of workers indexed on the unit
interval, each supplying a differentiated labour service j. As these services
are imperfect substitutes, workers can choose their wage subject to a Calvo-
Yun friction. The total nominal labour income earned by domestic workers is
´ 1
0 wt (j)nt (j) dj, where wt (j) and nt (j) denote each worker’s nominal wage
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and hours worked. There is full risk sharing across workers in each economy.
Wage setting
Wages are subject to nominal rigidities. In each period, only a fraction 1− θw
of workers can reset their wage; the rest must keep their existing one, with
no indexation. Assuming that utility is separable in labour and consumption,
the relevant part of the Lagrangian for the optimal wage setting problem of
workers in the home country is
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βθw)τ
{
u (ct+τ , nt+τ ) + λt+τ
ˆ 1
0
w¯t (j)
pt+τ
nt+τ (j) dj
}
.
w¯t (j) is worker j’s current reset wage in nominal terms. The labour demand
faced by this worker at time t+ τ is
nt+τ (j) =
(
wt+τ (j)
wt+τ
)−ψt
nt+τ .
Foreign workers solve an analogous problem.
In a symmetric equilibrium where all wage setters choose the same reset
wage, recursive auxiliary variables f 1h,t and f 2h,t can be defined as shown below
to rewrite the optimal wage-setting conditions compactly as
f 1h,t =Mw,tf 2h,t,
where the desired “frictionless” wage markup is defined asMw,t ≡ ψtψt−1 .
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Employment agencies and labour demand
Firms demand a homogeneous labour service. Perfectly competitive contrac-
tors act as “labour packers” in each country: they purchase the differentiated
labour inputs and turn them into a composite labour service. They maximise
profits subject to a standard CES technology:
max
nt(j)
wtnt −
ˆ 1
0
wt (j)nt (j) dj s.t. nt =
(ˆ 1
0
nt (j)
ψt−1
ψt dj
) ψt
ψt−1
.
The elasticity of substitution between different types of labour (ψt) is subject
to exogenous disturbances that make the wage markup volatile and determine
cost-push shocks in the labour market. These disturbances follow a stochastic
process analogous to that of the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
goods (εt), with a steady-state level ψ¯. They generate further fluctuations in
the gap between the natural (i.e. flexible-prices and flexible-wages) allocation
and its efficient counterpart, exacerbating the monetary policy tradeoff.
The labour demand schedules that solve the problem of labour packers in
the home country are as follows:
nt (j) =
(
wt (j)
wt
)−ψt
nt.
A zero-profit condition implies the following aggregate nominal wage index:
wt =
(ˆ 1
0
wt (j)1−ψt dj
) 1
1−ψt
.
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Aggregate production function
The aggregate supply of labour is found by integrating the hours purchased
by employment agencies over labour types j:
nst =
ˆ 1
0
nt (j) dj =
ˆ 1
0
(
wt (j)
wt
)−ψt
ndtdj = dwh,tndt .
Notice that nst depends on the aggregation technology adopted by the labour
packers, and it includes a first source of inefficiency: nominal wage dispersion,
measured by the index
dwh,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
(
wt (j)
wt
)−ψt
dj.
The aggregate demand for labour is found by integrating individual demands
for composite labour services over intermediate goods producers i:
ndt =
ˆ 1
0
ndt (i) di =
ˆ 1
0
yh,t (i)
at
di = dph,t
yh,t
at
.
ndt depends on the aggregation technology adopted by the producers of final
goods, and includes a second source of inefficiency: price dispersion.
Equating labour demand and supply, we obtain the exact relationship be-
tween aggregate output, employment and technology in this environment:
yh,t =
atnt
dwh,td
p
h,t
.
With flexible wages, dwh,t = 1 so the aggregate production function (9) obtains.
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Relative marginal cost
Comparing firm i’s real marginal cost mch,t (i) = wt/ph,tmpnt (i) with the
economy-wide average real marginal cost mch,t = wt/ph,tmpnt and using the
individual and average marginal products of labour implied by the individual
and aggregate production functions, we get an equation that facilitates the
passage from individual to aggregate price dynamics in the optimal pricing
problem:
mch,t (i) =
mch,t
dwh,td
p
h,t
.
Aggregate profits
The total cost of production of a given variety i in the home country is
Ψ (yh,t (i)) =
wt
ph,t
nt (i) =
wt
ph,t
yh,t (i)
at
,
which can be rewritten as a function of the price:
Ψ (ph,t (i)) =
wt
ph,t
yh,t
at
(
ph,t (i)
ph,t
)−εt
.
Firms’ aggregate profits are decreasing in the dispersion of prices and wages:
Πh,t ≡
ˆ 1
0
Πh,t (i) di
= yh,t
ˆ 1
0
(
ph,t (i)
ph,t
)1−εt
di− wt
ph,t
ˆ 1
0
nt (i) di
= yh,t − wt
ph,t
yh,t
at
dwh,td
p
h,t.
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Optimal price setting
By direct substitution of the constraints in the price setter’s objective function,
the problem becomes
max
p¯h,t
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(θpβ)τ
(
λt+τ
λt
)yh,t+τ
(
p¯h,t
ph,t+τ
)1−εt
−Ψ (yh,t+τ (i))
 .
The FOCs written in terms of the economy-wide marginal cost are as follows:
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(θpβ)τ
(
λt+τ
λt
)yh,t+τph,t+τ
(
p¯h,t
ph,t+τ
)−εt
= Et
∞∑
τ=0
(θpβ)τ
(
λt+τ
λt
) mch,t+τdwh,t+τdph,t+τ
(
εt
εt − 1
)
yh,t+τ
ph,t+τ
(
p¯h,t
ph,t+τ
)−1−εt .
If we define two auxiliary variables
g2h,t ≡ Et
∞∑
τ=0
(θpβ)τ
(
λt+τ
λt
)yh,t+τ
(
p¯h,t
ph,t
)−εt ( ph,t
ph,t+τ
)1−εt ,
g1h,t ≡ Et
∞∑
τ=0
(θpβ)τ
(
λt+τ
λt
) mch,t+τdwh,t+τdph,t+τ yh,t+τ
(
p¯h,t
ph,t
)−1−εt ( ph,t
ph,t+τ
)−εt ,
we can rewrite the FOCs compactly as
g2h,t =
(
εt
εt − 1
)
g1h,t.
Additional manipulation yields a recursive formulation of these variables:
g2h,t ≡ yh,t (p˜h,t)−εt + θpβEt
(
λt+1
λt
)
g2h,t+1
(
p˜h,t
p˜h,t+1
)−εt ( 1
pih,t+1
)1−εt
,
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g1h,t ≡ yh,t
mch,t
dwh,td
p
h,t
(p˜h,t)−1−εt + θpβEt
(
λt+1
λt
)
g1h,t+1
(
p˜h,t
p˜h,t+1
)−1−εt ( 1
pih,t+1
)−εt
.
Optimal wage setting
Since workers supply any quantity of labour that satisfies the demand at the
chosen wage, the hours worked at time t+ τ by a worker who has been unable
to reset his wage since time t are as follows:
nt+τ (j) =
(
w¯t (j)
wt+τ
)−ψt
nt+τ =
w¯t (j)∏τs=1 1pit+s
wt+τ
−ψt nt+τ ,
where w¯t (j) is worker j’s real reset wage, whereas wt represents the real ag-
gregate wage index
wt =
(ˆ 1
0
wt (j)1−ψt di
) 1
1−ψt
.
By direct substitution of this real labour demand schedule into the worker’s
budget constraint we obtain
L = Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βθw)τ u (ct+τ , nt+τ )
+ (βθw)τ λt+τ
{
bt+τ
pt+τ
+
(
τ∏
s=1
1
pit+s
)1−ψt ˆ 1
0
w¯t (j)1−ψt nt+τ (wt+τ )ψt dj
+ (1− s)Ph,t+τΠh,t+τ + sPf,t+τΠf,t+τ − ct+τ − qt+τ
pt+τ
bt+τ+1
}
.
Assuming full consumption risk sharing across workers, the cost of supplying
work is identical across labour types. Since the labour demand schedule is the
same across labour types, we can focus on a symmetric equilibrium where all
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resetters choose the same reset wage w¯t. The first-order conditions are
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βθw)τ un (ct+τ , nt+τ )nt+τ (−ψt) (wt+τ )ψt (w¯t) −ψt−1
(
τ∏
s=1
1
pit+s
)−ψt
+ Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βθw)τ λt+τ
(
τ∏
s=1
1
pit+s
)1−ψt
nt+τ (wt+τ )ψt (1− ψt) (w¯t) −ψt = 0.
These can be rewritten compactly by means of two auxiliary variables:
f 1h,t ≡ w¯tEt
∞∑
τ=0
(βθw)τ λt+τ
(
τ∏
s=1
1
pit+s
)1−ψt
nt+τ
(
w¯t
wt+τ
)−ψt
,
f 2h,t ≡ −Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βθw)τ un (ct+τ , nt+τ )
(
τ∏
s=1
1
pit+s
)−ψt
nt+τ
(
w¯t
wt+τ
)−ψt
,
f 1h,t =
(
ψt
ψt − 1
)
f 2h,t.
Additional manipulation yields a useful recursive formulation:
f 1h,t ≡ (w¯t)1−ψt (wt)ψt λtnt + βθwEt
(
1
pit+1
)1−ψt ( w¯t
w¯t+1
)1−ψt
f 1h,t+1,
f 2h,t ≡ −un (ct, nt)nt
(w¯t
wt
)−ψt
+ βθwEt
(
1
pit+1
)−ψt ( w¯t
w¯t+1
)−ψt
f 2h,t+1.
Dynamics of wages
Applying the Calvo-Yun algebra to the nominal wage index, we obtain the law
of motion of wages subject to nominal rigidities:
1 = θw
(
wt−1
wt
)1−ψt
+ (1− θw)
(
w¯t
wt
)1−ψt
.
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We can define an optimal relative wage w˜t ≡ w¯t/wt and write the law of motion
of wage dispersion recursively:
dwh,t = θw
(
1
piw,t
)−ψt
dwh,t−1 + (1− θw) (w˜t)−ψt .
Monetary policy
In order to reduce wage distortions, central banks must adjust their policy
instruments in response to movements in nominal wages16. The Taylor rules
(3) and (4) must prescribe that interest rates also react to the movements of
the gross wage inflation rates piw,t ≡ wt/wt−1 and pi∗w,t ≡ w∗t /w∗t−1:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)γR [
(pih,t)γpi (piw,t)γw
(
yh,t
yh,t−1
)γy]1−γR
mt,
R∗t
R∗
=
(
R∗t−1
R∗
)γR [
(pif,t)γpi
(
pi∗w,t
)γw ( yf,t
yf,t−1
)γy]1−γR
m∗t .
Equilibrium conditions under sticky wages
Since nominal variables are not uniquely determined, the system of equilibrium
conditions must be written in terms of real variables and relative prices for
computational convenience. To do so, one can define the terms of trade as the
16As argued by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), the natural allocation cannot be
obtained when both price and wage dispersion exist. To restore the natural level of output,
zero inflation would be needed in the markets for labour and goods at the same time; this
would impede the real wage adjustments that sustain the natural allocation.
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ratio st ≡ pf,t/ph,t and then rewrite all prices as PPI-to-CPI ratios:
Ph,t ≡ ph,t
pt
= (st)−ζ , Pf,t ≡ pf,t
pt
= (st)1−ζ ,
P∗h,t ≡
ph,t
p∗t
= (st)ζ−1 , P∗f,t ≡
pf,t
p∗t
= (st)ζ .
Real wages are defined in a conventional way:
wt ≡ wt
pt
, w∗t ≡
w∗t
p∗t
.
With this notation, the equilibrium of the model is as follows:
ch,t = (1− ζ) ct
Ph,t
,
cf,t = ζ
ct
Pf,t
,
c∗f,t = (1− ζ)
c∗t
P∗f,t
,
c∗h,t = ζ
c∗t
P∗h,t
,
yh,t = ch,t + c∗h,t,
yf,t = cf,t + c∗f,t,
uc (ct, nt) = λt,
f 1h,t =Mw,tf 2h,t,
f 1h,t = w¯t
(wt
w¯t
)ψt
λtnt + βθwEt (pit+1)ψt−1
(
w¯t
w¯t+1
)1−ψt
f 1h,t+1,
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f 2h,t = −un (ct, nt)nt
(w¯t
wt
)−ψt
+ βθwEt (pit+1)ψt
(
w¯t
w¯t+1
)−ψt
f 2h,t+1,
Mw,t = ψt
ψt − 1 ,
qt = βEt
(
λt+1
λt
1
pit+1
)
,
ct +
qt
pt
bt+1 =
bt
pt
+ wtnt + (1− s)Ph,tΠh,t + sPf,tΠf,t,
bt = 0,
uc (c∗t , n∗t ) = λ∗t ,
f 1f,t =M∗w,tf 2f,t,
f 1f,t = w¯∗t
(
w∗t
w¯∗t
)ψ∗t
λ∗tn
∗
t + βθwEt
(
pi∗t+1
)ψ∗t−1 ( w¯∗t
w¯∗t+1
)1−ψ∗t
f 1f,t+1,
f 2f,t = −un (c∗t , n∗t )n∗t
(
w¯∗t
w∗t
)−ψ∗t
+ βθwEt
(
pi∗t+1
)ψ∗t ( w¯∗t
w¯∗t+1
)−ψ∗t
f 2f,t+1,
M∗w,t =
ψ∗t
ψ∗t − 1
,
q∗t = βEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
1
pi∗t+1
)
,
c∗t +
q∗t
p∗t
b∗t+1 =
b∗t
p∗t
+ w∗tn∗t + (1− s)P∗f,tΠf,t + sP∗h,tΠh,t,
b∗t = 0,
yh,t =
atnt
dwh,td
p
h,t
,
yf,t =
a∗tn
∗
t
dwf,td
p
f,t
,
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mch,t =
wt
Ph,t
dwh,td
p
h,t
at
,
mcf,t =
w∗t
P∗f,t
dwf,td
p
f,t
a∗t
,
dwh,t = θw
(wt−1
wt
)−ψt
(pit)ψt dwh,t−1 + (1− θw)
(w¯t
wt
)−ψt
,
dwf,t = θw
(
w∗t−1
w∗t
)−ψ∗t
(pi∗t )
ψ∗t dwf,t−1 + (1− θw)
(
w¯∗t
w∗t
)−ψ∗t
,
w¯t
wt
=
[
1− θw (piw,tpit)ψt−1
1− θw
] 1
1−ψt
,
w¯∗t
w∗t
=
1− θw
(
pi∗w,tpi
∗
t
)ψ∗t−1
1− θw

1
1−ψ∗
t
,
dh,t = θp (pih,t)εt dh,t−1 + (1− θp) (p˜h,t)−εt ,
df,t = θp (pif,t)ε
∗
t df,t−1 + (1− θp) (p˜f,t)−ε
∗
t ,
p˜h,t =
[
1− θp (pih,t)εt−1
1− θp
] 1
1−εt
,
p˜f,t =
[
1− θp (pif,t)ε
∗
t−1
1− θp
] 1
1−ε∗
t
,
pih,t =
Ph,t
Ph,t−1
pit,
pif,t =
Pf,t
Pf,t−1
pi∗t ,
g2h,t =Mp,tg1h,t,
g1h,t = yh,t
mch,t
dwh,td
p
h,t
(p˜h,t)−1−εt + θpβEt
(
λt+1
λt
)(
p˜h,t
p˜h,t+1
)−1−εt
(pih,t+1)εt g1h,t+1,
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g2h,t = yh,t (p˜h,t)
−εt + θpβEt
(
λt+1
λt
)(
p˜h,t
p˜h,t+1
)−εt
(pih,t+1)εt−1 g2h,t+1,
Mp,t = εt
εt − 1 ,
g2f,t =M∗p,tg1f,t,
g1f,t = yf,t
mcf,t
dwf,td
p
f,t
(p˜f,t)−1−ε
∗
t + θpβEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
)(
p˜f,t
p˜f,t+1
)−1−ε∗t
(pif,t+1)ε
∗
t g1f,t+1,
g2f,t = yf,t (p˜f,t)
−ε∗t + θpβEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
)(
p˜f,t
p˜f,t+1
)−ε∗t
(pif,t+1)ε
∗
t−1 g2f,t+1,
M∗p,t =
ε∗t
ε∗t − 1
,
Rt =
1
qt
,
R∗t =
1
q∗t
,
Rt
1/β =
(
Rt−1
1/β
)γR [
(pih,t)γpi (piw,t)γw
(
yh,t
yh,t−1
)γy]1−γR
mt,
R∗t
1/β =
(
R∗t−1
1/β
)γR [
(pif,t)γpi
(
pi∗w,t
)γw ( yf,t
yf,t−1
)γy]1−γR
m∗t ,
piw,t =
wt−1
wt
1
pit
,
pi∗w,t =
w∗t−1
w∗t
1
pi∗t
,
log at = ρa log at−1 + ea,t,
log a∗t = ρa log a∗t−1 + e∗a,t,
logmt = ρm logmt−1 + em,t,
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logm∗t = ρm logm∗t−1 + e∗m,t,
log
(
εt
ε¯
)
= ρε log
(
εt−1
ε¯
)
+ eε,t,
log
(
ε∗t
ε¯
)
= ρε log
(
ε∗t−1
ε¯
)
+ e∗ε,t,
log
(
ψt
ψ¯
)
= ρψ log
(
ψt−1
ψ¯
)
+ eψ,t,
log
(
ψ∗t
ψ¯
)
= ρψ log
(
ψ∗t−1
ψ¯
)
+ e∗ψ,t,
Πh,t = yh,t − wt
Ph,t
yh,t
at
dwh,td
p
h,t,
Πf,t = yf,t − w
∗
t
P∗f,t
yf,t
a∗t
dwf,td
p
f,t,
Vh,t = u (ct, nt) + βEtVh,t+1,
Vf,t = u (c∗t , n∗t ) + βEtVf,t+1.
Equilibrium adjustment to labour supply shocks
I append the parameter specification in Table 5 to that in Table 1. To capture
the fact that wages adjust slower than prices, my wage stickiness parameter
implies a four-quarter average duration of wage spells, as opposed to a three-
quarter average duration of price spells—in line with evidence by Druant et al.
(2009), among others. The steady state value of ψ equals that of ε. The price
and wage inflation coefficients in the Taylor rule are chosen so that their sum
equals 1.5, which is the value of γpi under the baseline calibration in Table 117.
17It is the sum of these two coefficients that matters for determinacy in economies with
sticky prices and wages; see Galí (2008).
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Table 5: Additional calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Description
θw 0.75 Wage stickiness parameter
ψ¯ 6 Steady-state ES between labour types
γw, γpi 0.75 Wage and price inflation parameters in the Taylor rule
ρψ 0.95 Serial correlation of the ES between labour types
std (eψ) 0.01 Standard deviation of labour market cost-push shocks
Figure 7 displays the IRFs of selected macroeconomic variables to an ad-
verse cost-push shock in the labour market of the home country, brought about
by a 1 percent drop in ψt. The shock raises local real wages and reduces prof-
its. With transfers (s1/2, solid blue lines), the drop in dividend payments from
the home country triggers cross-border wealth effects that boost foreign labour
supply. This affects foreign profits and spills over into domestic labour supply,
in turn, exacerbating the fall in domestic economic activity. These effects do
not occur without transfers (s0, dashed red lines).
The response of real wages to the shock is hump-shaped due to the sluggish
adjustment of both nominal wages and prices. This is reflected in the dynamics
of aggregate domestic profits too. In the presence of a dividend redistribution
scheme, wealth effects imply that the responses of foreign consumption, hours
and output are hump-shaped as well.
The impulse responses to technology, monetary and cost-push shocks in
the goods market are analogous to those observed under flexible wages.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to a cost-push shock in the labour market with
and without transfers
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Monetary policy and welfare
If shocks to the ES between labour types are as small as in Table 5, the cost of
ignoring output fluctuations is negligible and the control of (price and wage)
inflation remains the sole goal of the monetary authority. If cost-push shocks
are large enough, though, the natural level of output departs significantly from
its efficient counterpart and the stabilisation of economic activity becomes an
important additional goal of monetary policy.
Table 6 shows how the welfare-maximising calibration of the Taylor rules
(with γw constrained from exceeding 4 as well) varies with the share of redis-
tributed dividends when std (eψ) = std (eε) = 0.1. The pattern that emerges
resembles that observed in Table 4. The welfare-maximising γy is positive and
constant as transfers range between 0 and 50 percent of profits; beyond that,
γy declines due to the wealth effects mechanism outlined above.
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Table 6: Size of transfers and monetary policy mix with labour supply shocks
s 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
(γR, γpi, γw, γy) (0, 4, 4, 2.9) (0, 4, 4, 2.9) (0, 4, 4, 2.8) (0, 4, 4, 2.5) (0, 4, 4, 2.1)
To verify the claim that the impact of transfers on monetary policy depends
on the direction of wealth effects and therefore on the sources of business cycles,
let us increase the relative importance of the shocks to technology and labour
supply by setting std (ea) = std (eψ) = 0.1, while we keep std (em) = std (eε) =
0.01. Table 7 confirms that a greater emphasis on output stabilisation emerges
as transfers get larger in this case.
Table 7: Size of transfers and monetary policy mix with large a and ψ shocks
s 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
(γR, γpi, γw, γy) (0, 4, 4, 1.1) (0, 4, 4, 1.2) (0, 4, 4, 1.3) (0, 4, 4, 1.3) (0, 4, 4, 1.3)
Comparing Tables 6 and 7, we see that to draw conclusions about the most
appropriate monetary policy mix under international trasfers one must take a
stance on the sources of business cycles. This issue is still debated.
Smets and Wouters (2007) investigated the sources of business cycle fluc-
tuations in the United States between 1966 and 2004 in the context of a log-
linearised DSGE model with both price and wage stickiness. If the exogenous
processes of my model were parameterised according to their estimates18, tech-
nology shocks would be the dominant source of output and consumption fluc-
tuations19, so countercyclical transfers would prevail under a profits redistri-
18They indicate std (ea) = 0.45, std (em) = 0.24, std (eε) = 0.14 and std (eψ) = 0.24.
19Domestic technology shocks would represent as much as 98% of the variance of output
and almost 30% of the variance of consumption (with the remaining 70% being almost
entirely explained by foreign technology shocks).
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bution scheme. This would strengthen the case for flexible inflation targeting.
Two notes of caution are in order at this point. First, the Smets and
Wouters posteriors make macroeconomic variables implausibly volatile in the
present model. More reasonable volatilities would emerge under the Smets and
Wouters priors: std (ea) = std (em) = std (eε) = std (eψ) = 0.10. With that
calibration, the welfare surface is quite flat along the γy dimension and the
welfare-maximising monetary policy mix appears nearly invariant to the size
of the income transfer scheme. Second, other studies such as Ireland (2004)
point to monetary disturbances and cost-push shocks in the goods markets
as the main drivers of macroeconomic fluctuations. For the reasons explained
above, procyclical transfers are likely to prevail in that case, weakening the
case for output stabilisation.
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